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1105262
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Course |
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Advanced Microeconomics
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Faculty |
Marcus Asplund (MAS), Professor, CBS, Department of Economics
Anette Boom (AB), Associate Professor, CBS, Department of Economics
Karol Szwagrzak (KS), Assistant Professor, CBS, Department of Economics
Jurre Thiel (JUTH) , Assistant Professor, CBS, Department of Economics
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Course Coordinator |
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Anette Boom, Associate Professor, CBS, Department of Economics, ab.eco@cbs.dk
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Prerequisites |
The course is compulsory for the PhD students of Copenhagen Business School’s Department of Economics, but also open to other PhD students with knowledge of intermediate microeconomics, some econometrics, as well as mathematical tools like multivariate calculus, constrained maximization, and
linear algebra, and basic probability and statistics.
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Aim |
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The aim of the course is to get the students acquainted with the most important models and methods used in advanced microeconomic theory in order to enable them to apply these models and methods later in their own research.
This is done by introducing the students to either very influential and/or recent academic research.
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Course content |
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The course covers the following topics:
1. Decisions Theory (Uncertainty, Risk, and Time preferences)
2. Game Theory,
3. Mechanism Design and Contract Theory.
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Teaching style |
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Lectures and student workshops.
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Lecture plan |
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Syllabus |
Week 41
05.10.2020
9-12am
& 1-4pm |
Introduction (KS and MAS)
Read before the lecture: Chapter 1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapters 8-10 and 16
in Gilboa (2009).
The lecture starts illustrating the interaction between theoretical microeconomic
models and empirical research on real-life economic problems. For this purpose,
MAS will present current research on an empirical test of bargaining theory.
The lecture then provides an overview of course and guidance on how to approach
the readings in rest of the programme.
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Week 45
03.11.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Revealed Preferences (KS)
Selected chapters from Chambers and Echenique (2016)
Bernheim and Rangel (2009) or Masatlioglu et al. (2012) or Salant and Rubinstein
(2008) or Chambers et al. (2017)
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Week 45
04.11.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Risk and Uncertainty (KS)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Klibanoff et al. (2005)
Students might also present either Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Strzalecki (2011),
Olszewski (2007), Ahn (2008), or Bordalo et al. (2012)
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Week 45
09.11.2020
10-111:45am &
1.15-3.15pm |
Time Preferences, Peferences for Flexibility, Temptation and Self-control (KS)
Kreps (1979), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982), Dekel et al. (2001), Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001), Bleichrodt et al. (2008), or Sarver (2008)
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Week 45
06.11.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Stochastic Choice (KS)
Gul and Pesendorfer 2006, Ahn and Sarver (2013), Gul et al. (2014), Manzini and
Mariotti (2014), Lu (2016), Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2019)
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Week 50
08.12.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm
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Game Theory (KS)
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Chapter 1,2,6 & 11 and 12
The lecture gives you an overview over important game theoretic concepts which
are used in the literature on which the rest of the course is based.
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Week 50
09.12.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Mechanism Design (KS)
Jackson (2014), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), Kojima and Pathak (2009)
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Week 50
10.12.2020
10-12am |
Student Workshops: Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling (AB)
Students are divided into three groups and each presents one of the three topics.
They can take inspiration from Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)
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Week 51
15.12.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Taking Theory to the Data: Consumer Choice in Health Insurance (JUTH)
Adams and Abaluck (2018), Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf and Cullen (2013),
Einav and Finkelstein (2018), Handel (2013), Handel and Schwartzstein (2018),
Keane (2010)
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Week 51
16.12.2020
10-12am &
1-3pm |
Auction Theory (AB)
Myerson (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000), Goeree and Offerman (2003),
Burkett and Woodward (2020)
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Week 51
17.12.2019
10-12am &
1-3pm |
The Theory of the Firm (AB)
Grosman and Hart (1986), Levin (2003), Hart and Moore (2008)
How to Write a Referee Report? (AB)
Berk, Harvey and Hirshleifer (2017)
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Learning objectives |
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After the course, students shall be able to:
- demonstrate knowledge of the concepts, models, methods and tools of advanced microeconomic theory as discussed during the course,
- read and understand international research papers expanding the frontier of microeconomic research,
- apply and adapt advanced microeconomic models to specific research questions,
- and evaluate microeconomic models used by other scholars.
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Exam |
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Assessment
In order to pass, students have to master three different tasks in a satisfactory manner with the
possibility of retaking each of them once.
1. The students have to either hand in the solutions to one problem-set or to hand in a
research proposal on the basis of the microeconomic theory taught in the class. The
hand out date for the problem set is January 4, 2021 and hand in date for either the
research proposal or the solutions of the problem set is January 18, 2021.
2. They have to present one academic research article mentioned in the lecture plan
below and comment on the presentation of another student in class.
3. They have to write a referee report on an unpublished microeconomic theory paper of
their own choice and hand it in until December 31, 2020.
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Other |
The course starts on October 5 (week 41) with an introduction and continues in three blocks from November 3 to November 6 (week 45) and from December 08-10, 2020 (week 50) and from December 15-17, 2020 (see the details in the lecturing plan).
The class includes 44 confrontation hours.
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Start date |
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05/10/2020
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End date |
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17/12/2020
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Level |
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PhD
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ECTS |
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7
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Language |
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English
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Course Literature |
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Selected chapters from:
Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Chambers, Christopher P. and Federico Echenique (2016), Revealed Preference Theory, Econometric
Society Monograph, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Gilboa, Itzhak (2009), Theory of Decision under Uncertainty, Econometric Society Monographs 45,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, Matthew O., Mechanism Theory (December 26, 2014). Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2542983
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford
University Press: New York and Oxford.
Osborne, Martin and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Selected Journal Articles
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Fee |
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DKK 9100,- / Euro1225,-
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Minimum number of participants |
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Maximum number of participants |
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0
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Location |
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Contact information |
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PhD Support
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Registration deadline |
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28/08/2020
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Please note that your registration is binding after the registration deadline.
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