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896984 |
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Course |
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| Advanced Microeconomics | ||
Faculty |
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Morten Lau, Professor,, CBS, Department of Economics, mla.eco@cbs.dk Karol Szwagrzak, Associate Professor, CBS, Department of Economics, ksz.eco@cbs.dk Anette Boom, Associate Professor, CBS, Department of Economics, ab.eco@cbs.dk |
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Course Coordinator |
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| Associate Professor Anette Boom | ||
Prerequisites |
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| The course is compulsory for the PhD students of Copenhagen Business School’s Department of Economics, but also open to other PhD students who can prove some knowledge in intermediate microeconomics as well as in some mathematical tools like multivariate calculus, constrained maximization and linear algebra. | ||
Aim |
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After the course, students shall be able to: • demonstrate knowledge of the concepts, models, methods and tools of advanced microeconomic theory as discussed during the course, • read and understand international research papers that employ advanced microeconomic models, • apply and adapt advanced micro economic models to specific research questions, • and evaluate microeconomic models applied and adapted by other scholars. |
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Course content |
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The aim of the course is to get the students acquainted with the most important models and methods used in advanced microeconomic theory in order to enable them to apply these models and methods later in their own research. The course should cover the following topics: 1. Utility theory, decision making, demand and supply theory, 2. General equilibrium theory and welfare economics, 3. Uncertainty, Risk and Time Preferences, 4. Game theory, 5. Contract theory. |
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Teaching style |
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| Lectures, student workshops and exercise classes. | ||
Lecture plan |
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Status of the Lecture Plan and Reading List for Part I: Theory The lecture plan and reading list is tentative, meaning that there might be changes about which you will be informed. Week 37 -12 September (10-11:45) - Lecture and Exercise: Preferences, Utility, and Choice (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 Week 38 - 19 September (10-11:45) - Lecture: Lecture and Exercise: Preferences, Utility, and Choice (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapters 6 Week 38 - 22 September (13:15-16) - Lecture: Choice under Uncertainty (KS) Gilboa (2009), Chapter 8, 9, 10 (pp 78-104), 12 (pp 123-137), 14 (pp 142-144) Week 40 - 3 October (9-12) - Lecture: Analysis of the Market Mechanism in Exchange and Production (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 15 Week 40 - 6 October (13:15-16) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Competitive Equilibrium and Welfare (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 16 Week 41 - 11 October (10-11:45) and 12 October (14:15-16) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: General Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness and Stability (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 17 (21 A-C and 22 A-C) Week 43 - 24 October (10-11:45) Lecture: Elicitation of Risk Preferences (ML) Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison and Swarthout (2016) Week 44 - 31 October (10-11:45) - Lecture: Discounting Functions (ML) Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008), Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014) Week 45 - 7 November (9-12) - Lecture: Basic Concepts and Results in Game Theory (KS) Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Part I Week 46 - 14 November 9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Repetition and Cooperation in Game Theory (KS) Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Chapter 6, 7, 8 Week 47 - 21 November (9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Incomplete Information and Bayesian Games (KS) Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Part III Week 48 - 28 November (9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Mechanism Design (KS) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 23 Week 49 - 5 December (9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop : Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard (AB) Mas-Collell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 13 and 14 Week 50 - 12 December (9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Auctions (AB) Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Chapter 7 Week 51 - 19 December (9-12) - Lecture and Exercise/Workshop: Incomplete Contracts (AB) Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Chapter 11 and 12 Textbooks: Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press Articles: Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom (2008), “Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences,” Econometrica, 76(3), pp. 583-618 Andersen, Steffen; Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom (2014), “Discounting Behavior: A Reconsideration,” European Economic Review, 71, pp. 15-33. Andersen, Steffen; Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom (2011), Intertemporal Utility and Correlation Aversion, Working Paper 2011-04, Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk, Georgia State University. Andreoni, James, and Charles Sprenger (2012a), “Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets,” American Economic Review, 102(7), pp. 3333-3356. Andreoni, James, and Charles Sprenger (2012b), “Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences,” American Economic Review, 102(7), pp. 3357-3376. Binswanger, Hans P. (1981), “Attitudes Toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of an Experiment in Rural India,” Economic Journal, 91(December), pp. 867-890. Conlisk, John (1989), “Three Variants on the Allais Example,” American Economic Review, 79(3), pp. 392-407. Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp and Gert G. Wagner (2011), “Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(3), pp. 500-522. Grether, David M. and Charles R., Plott (1979), “Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon,” American Economic Review, 69(4), pp. 623-648. Harrison, Glenn W; Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutström (2007), “Estimating Risk Attitudes in Denmark: A Field Experiment,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(2), pp. 341-368. Harrison, Glenn W; Morten I. Lau, and Melonie B. Williams (2002), “Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 92(5), pp. 1606-1617. Harrison, Glenn W., and E. Elisabet Rutström (2009), “Expected Utility Theory and Prospect theory: One Wedding and A Decent Funeral,” Experimental Economics, 12, pp. 133-158. Hey, John D., and Chris Orme (1994), “Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental Data,” Econometrica, 62(6), pp. 1291-1326. Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury (2002), “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects”, American Economic Review, 92, pp. 1644-1655. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) , “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, 47, pp. 263-291. Plott, Charles R., and Kathryn Zeiler (2005), “The Willingness to Pay – Willingness to Accept Gap, the Endowment Effect, Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations,” American Economic Review, 95(3), pp. 530-545. Quiggin, John (1982), “A Theory of Anticipated Utility,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), pp. 323-343. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman (1992) “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representations of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 5, pp. 297-323. Supplementary Literature: Other textbooks which have a good coverage of (parts of) Advanced Microeconomics: Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. Jehle, Geoffrey and Philip J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Third Edition, Harlow, London et al.: Prentice Hall. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (2002), The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA and London, Varian, Hal A. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, New York: Norton. Suggested Articles: The lecturers will refer to other relevant articles during their lectures and will each suggest a collection of articles from which you can choose to present in order to fulfil your part of your obligations to pass the course. |
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Learning objectives |
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| Please see 'Aim of the course' | ||
Exam |
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In order to pass the course the students have to master two different tasks in a satisfactory manner. 1. They have to hand in the solutions to four problem sets and get approval on 3 out of 4. 2. They have to present two academic research papers from two different sections of the course. The papers will be suggested by the instructors. |
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Other |
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This course may be followed by a limited number of students from the Master’s in Advanced economics and Finance (Cand.Oecon.). To sign up send a one-page motivational letter and a grade transcript to ily.stu@cbs.dk no later than Monday 10 July 2017. |
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Start date |
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| 11/09/2017 | ||
End date |
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| 19/12/2017 | ||
Level |
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| PhD | ||
ECTS |
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| 7.5 | ||
Language |
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| English | ||
Course Literature |
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| This is indicative:• The main text isMas-Collell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford.• Supplementary textbooks areBolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2004), Contract Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, MAJehle, Geoffrey A. and Philip J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ.Osborne, Martin and Ariel Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.• Academic journal articles applying models taught in the course. | ||
Fee |
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| 9,750 DKK | ||
Minimum number of participants |
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| 10 | ||
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Maximum number of participants |
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| 15 | ||
Location |
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The class includes 42 confrontation hours during 14 weeks. Please see Lecture Plan for dates and time. All sessions take place i PH16A - room 2.80 |
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Contact information |
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PhD Support Bente S. Ramovic bsr.research@cbs.dk Tel +45 3815 3138 |
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Registration deadline |
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| 15/08/2017 | ||
| Please note that registration is binding after the registration deadline. | ||